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descendant to its old seashore home, and, *presto*, the original type reappears. The causes and extent of these remarkable "adjustments of internal relations to external relations," to use Spencer's phrase, remain to be more thoroughly investigated. They furnish the main motive of the anti-selectionists as well as the basis of the new teleology of such writers as Driesch, who believes that the purposive direction of the activities of protoplasm constitutes a problem as insoluble as the nature of life itself. Driesch does not find in these phenomena a proof of the specific Lamarckian problem, nor can we. In fact, it is essentially a distinct problem, which has arisen since Lamarck's and even since Darwin's time, although suggested by some of Darwin's critics, such as Asa Gray.

The latter half of the work, devoted to the utility problem, opens with the demonstration that Darwinism is primarily a theory of the origin of adaptations; secondarily, of the origin of species and of all natural divisions of animals and plants. This is followed by a detailed review of the whole subject of the usefulness or neutrality of characters of different kinds in the struggle for existence. As in the earlier sections, Mr. Romanes shows conclusively that he has Darwin upon his side and that the Wallace-Weismann position is ultra-Darwinian.


Like the original volume, this is an excellent work to place in the hands of students, from its singularly fair and accurate treatment of Post-Darwinian questions. We close it with renewed regret that the conclusion must come from another hand.

HENRY F. OSBORN.

MIND AND MOTION AND MONISM. By the late *George John Romanes, M. A., LL.D., F. R. S.* New York and London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1895. Pages, 170.

This posthumous edition of the late Prof. George John Romanes's articles *Mind and Motion and Monism* outlines the philosophical basis of his religious position as set forth in his *Thoughts on Religion*. Professor Romanes advocates the theory of parallelism between mind and motion as now accepted by all scientific psychologists, according to which a thought or sensation is regarded as the psychical aspect of a brain-motion, and a brain-motion as the physiological aspect of a psychical event of some kind. We observe the motions of our fellow beings and conclude that their actions are accompanied with feeling the same as are our own actions of like kind. We observe objects only and objective motion, but we suppose them to be animated according to their organisation. This theory is called Monism, combining the two one-sided positions of spiritualism and materialism. Clifford calls the soul with which we endow the motions of our fellow creatures, an eject (in contradistinction to "object"), and concluding that even physical events possess an aspect that is analogous to the psychical aspect of brain-motion, speaks of the world as an eject. Romanes endorses Clifford's theory but makes his own application. Considering the fact that all motions have their psychical aspects, he concludes that we cannot know what psychical value the cosmic motions of planets

and stars may have, and drawing the adjoined diagram he establishes upon the basis of this "monistic agnosticism" his belief in the existence of God, not indeed as a verifiable theory but as an hypothesis for which there is a great probability, and which may at least provisionally be used until we find ourselves obliged to replace it by more exact knowledge. In the adjoined diagram, *Z* the dark centre of our experience represents the brain-motions of man, darkly shaded in order to indicate their deep psychic significance. *Y* represents the sphere of the lower animals whose psychic life is dimmer and less concentrated. In *X* we reach the inorganic domain, which, according to Clifford, remains unshaded on account of the absence of organisation, while to theologians and theists generally it ought to be shaded more deeply than *Y* and *Z*.



The existence of the God of Professor Romanes is, as conceded by himself, quite provisional and hypothetical, and is therefore unavailable as a religious idea. But granting that Professor Romanes's God existed and was endowed with a personal consciousness, what would God be? He would be a huge, world-large ego, a gigantic personality, an individual creature of an enormous size; but he would be a concrete and particular being of a definite organisation like ourselves. He would be the spirit of the universe, and would, like all souls, be thinking, willing, and plodding. This is Brahma, the world-soul, but not God, for such a world-ego lacks all the attributes of divinity and possesses all the qualities of individual creatures. What Buddha says of Ishvara, the personal God, applies in every respect with equal force to Professor Romanes's God; granting that he exists, we can recog-

nise in him only our eldest brother, not the ultimate authority of moral conduct. For he is not identical with the eternal Divinity which appears in the enlightenment of all the Buddhas, and Buddha's claim of being superior to Ishvara and Brahma is justified. Compare this world-soul-God to the Nomothetism, as we may call the God-conception of the Religion of Science, and you will at once understand that the true God cannot be an individual, not a particular being, not a concrete personality, but must be the eternal and omnipresent, supernatural¹ and superpersonal,² the immutable and irrefragable order of existence, the Logos that was in the beginning and whose divinity appears in the cosmic order which naturalists reveal to us in their various aspects called laws of nature.

Professor Romanes's God, in order to create and govern the world correctly, must first make himself acquainted with the eternal laws of being, he must make his calculations and consider his plans with reference to the laws of mechanics; he must work out designs which are liable to miscarry unless they agree with the immutable norms of eternal necessity. But Professor Romanes might say with others who share his belief in a personal world-ego-God, that God created the eternal laws of the universe; to which I reply that the formal laws (such as $2 \times 2 = 4$, the conservation of matter and energy, causality, etc.) are intrinsically necessary, and God could not have created them differently from what they are. If they are not parts and parcels of God, they are certainly more eternal, more divine, more immutable than God. They would be, and they are, the God of any world-soul-God; and if they are the god of all gods, why should not we recognise in them the sole God, the source of wisdom and righteousness. Taking this view, we understand that every rational being that is in possession of univocal concepts, bears God's image, and the morally perfect man is "God become flesh."

This is in brief our view of God as contrasted with Professor Romanes's God.

P. C.

SYSTEMATISCHE PHYLOGENIE DER WIRBELTHIERE. (Vertebrata.) By *Ernst Haeckel*.

Berlin: Georg Reimer. 1895. Pages, 680.

The first part of Professor Haeckel's "Systematic Phylogeny" appeared in 1894, and we may expect the second, which treats of the Invertebrates, in 1896. The present, or third part, gives in outline a hypothetical ancestral history of the Vertebrates. The original sketch and idea of this life-history of terrestrial organisms was propounded in 1866, and put in a popular form in 1868. The enormous

¹ The term "supernatural" must be taken in the literal sense of the word. The intrinsic necessity and universality which Kant discovered in transcendental cognition, implies that the most universal laws (such as $1 + 1 = 2$) hold good not only for this actual world in which we live but for any possible world; they are applicable to nature and to anything whether existent or non-existent. The Logos is not limited to our world-system; it is universally supreme; in a word, the Logos is supernatural.

² It would be misleading to conceive of God, the irrefragable law of existence, as simply bare of personality. God is the prototype of all personality, and possessing the conditions of personality, we propose to call him "superpersonal."